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Abstract: 
 
Recently there has been an influx of literature which tries to find out relationship between 
trade and poverty. Right is of the view that more international trade is good for the poor 
whereas left is quite skeptical of pro poor effects of trade. The paper provides a 
comprehensive review of recent literature on the topic in order to reach some neutral grounds. 
The paper finds out that though trade might carry positive affects for the poor in developing 
countries through growth, such gains are not equally distributed among the rich and the poor. 
The paper identifies at least 8 different effects of international trade which result in unequal 
outcomes and thus defies Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson theorem in a developing country set 
up. Since per decomposition, poverty is affected by growth or inequality, evidence of unequal 
gains from trade does imply that the relationship between trade and poverty is not as simple 
as the right seems to suggest. To this effect, the paper calls for more empirical work on trade 
and inequality especially as single country case studies. 
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1. Introduction: 
 
 
To date, most of the countries in our global village have embraced or initiated 
processes of liberalization. The idea is to follow neo-classical paradigm of free 
markets in order to achieve variety of economic as well as social objectives, as free 
markets are assumed to be one of the key catalysts for growth and its determinants. 
This belief in the efficacy of free markets has also been the basic guiding principle of 
contemporary globalization.  
 
Though globalization seems to promise a lot for both North and South, poor and rich, 
developed and underdeveloped, empowered and impoverished, such promises are yet 
to see the light of the day especially for those who live in underdeveloped, destitute 
and distant lands in the South. The underprivileged Southern peripheries question the 
fairness of ‘the globalization’ which is propagated by the proponents of free markets 
                                                 
1 The author is grateful to Mansoob Murshed and Karel Jansen for useful comments on a previous 
version.  
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and also justifies the stand of those who believe that globalization is nothing but a 
Northern tool to exploit and marginalize the South. 
 
Since it is tempting to get carried away with the rhetoric for or against globalization, 
the issue needs to be looked upon with objectivity and care. As an economist, I am 
bound to peer into the issue through the prism of economics rather than environment, 
sociology or anthropology. To economists the processes of contemporary 
globalization are at best be captured by the movements in international trade and 
financial flows that have taken place between different countries and regions in the 
last few decades. I will restrict myself to international trade in this paper. 
 
The first relevant question arises how economists view the notion of ‘free trade’? 
Well at least there is a consensus among the bests of both left2 and right that openness 
to international trade is imperative for economic development. Many studies have 
shown that trade is not only the engine of growth but it also sustains it (e.g. Sirnivasan 
and Bhagwati, 2001; Dollar and Kraay, 2004; Mamoon and Murshed, 2005a). It is 
also believed by the proponents of ‘free markets’ that the countries, developing as 
well as developed ones, who have opened up their economies more, have achieved 
better economic performance. For example, developing countries that opened up in 
the 1990s witnessed faster growth than the rich countries and hence are catching up. 
On the other hand it is asserted that the non globalizing part of the developing world 
is falling further and further behind (Dollar and Kraay, 2004). The accession to global 
economy has indeed brought prosperity to different areas in the world (Sen, 2002). In 
contrast with the general perception3, there is also some evidence that world poverty 
and inequality is declining. Sala-i-Martin (2002) in his much publicized paper, has 
shown the fraction of the world's population below the poverty line (defined as an 
income of $2 a day in constant 1985 dollars) has fallen to 18% in 1998 from 44% in 
1970, where as overall inequality (Gini-coefficient)4 has fallen to 0.63 in 1998 from 
0.66 in 19705.  
 
                                                 
2 One of the prominent economists known for his leftist stance on the process of Globalisation , Dani 
Rodrik, does seem to accept in his recent paper (see Rodriguez and Rodrik, 2000)  that trade 
liberalisation and growth are positively related. However he also emphasizes that it should not be 
considered as a substitute for other development strategy/ies.   
3 See for example Aisbett (2003) for detailed commentary about the basis of general perception among 
public that global poverty or inequality is on the rise. 
4 There are three categories of Gini-coefficients. Category 1inequaltiy takes into account per-capita 
incomes of the respective countries. In category 2, the per capita incomes are weighted by population 
size. However category 3 inequality takes into account within country inequalities, which makes it 
superior to the former categories. Sala-i-Martin (2002) employs category 3 measure of inequality. For a 
brief commentary on the three categories of inequality see Murshed (2003).. 
5 The paper also estimate other popular indexes of inequality i.e., the variance of log-income, two of 
Atkinsn’s indexes, the mean logarithmic deviation, The Theil Index and the coefficient of variation. All 
indexes show the same decreasing trends in inequality over the selected time period. However, 
Milonovic (2002) argued that Sala-i-Martin made many oversimplifying assumptions and failed to 
address two basic data problems (too few data to derive countries' income distributions, and sparseness 
of such data in time). According to Milanovic, Sala-i-Martin ended up by producing a population-
weighted inter-national distribution of income augmented by a constant shift parameter and not a 
distribution of income among world citizens which has made his results dubious. Additionally in his 
recent paper Milanovic (2003) showed that openness leads to regional inequality for populous regions 
with some getting ahead and others falling behind. 
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Recently, Dollar and Kraay (2004)6 have also shown that openness to international 
trade in particular appears to benefit poor people as much as everyone else. The study 
pointed out the experience of countries in the Asia and Pacific region (i.e., the 
Republic of Korea, Singapore, and Taipei, China) which contains a broad range of 
examples concerning both trade liberalization and poverty reduction. The paper also 
implied that reforms on average have had little effect on income distribution. Other 
recent cross country studies also emphasized opening up as necessary policy tool for 
poverty alleviation (i.e., Anderson, 1999).  
 
All in all proponents of globalization are confident that free trade carries significant 
pro poor growth effects7. However, the increasing concentration of world poverty in 
some regions of the world (e.g. Sub Saharan Africa, transition economies of central 
Asia) and instances of rise in spatial inequality8 in developing countries which have 
opened up (i.e. China, Vietnam, Mexico, Brazil, Chile, Columbia and Venezuela etc) 
implies that processes of growth needs a careful evaluation and we have to exhaust all 
possible channels through which poverty is affected. For example, trade might very 
well be good for poor because it is good for growth but if trade amplifies inequalities 
between regions, countries or income groups, it cannot claim to be the harbinger of 
welfare generation because income distribution is no less a vital determinant of 
poverty than growth itself.  
 
Many studies have tried to capture the relationship between trade liberalization and 
income inequality. The right is of the view that liberalization does not carry any 
significant effects on income distribution and at best the relationship is of neutral 
nature (Dollar and Kraay, 2004). However there is ample empirical evidence which 
suggest otherwise. For example, Behrman et al (2001) noticed that in 7 out of 18 
Latin American countries that initiated market reforms in the mid 1980s, inequality 
has actually increased in recent times. The rest of the economies in their sample 
showed that inequality was approximately same in 1990s to the levels of 1980s. 
Jayasuriya (2002), though accepting that liberalization has tended to reduce 
consumption poverty in South Asia, also joins the critics9 of Dollar and Kraay’s 
findings concerning neutral distributional effects of liberalization.  
 
Another fact, which undermines the results of Dollar and Kraay, is that cross country 
analysis has long been the source of criticism by many on the basis that such analysis 
can only capture average effects. The embedded drawback of such studies are at best 
summarized by Sirinivasan and Bhagwati (2002), “...The choice of period, of the 
sample, and of proxies, will often imply many effective degrees of freedom where one 
might almost get what one wants if one tries hard enough!” On the similar lines, 
Dollar and Kraay (2004) have been accused of sample selection bias. For example, 
                                                 
6 Dollar and Kraay (2004) is primarily an extension of their earlier work (i.e., Dollar and Kraay 2000) 
which focused on the Poverty impacts of Growth. 
7 Srinivasam and Bhagwati (2002) mention that high growth rates achieved by China and India are 
partly due to their opening up in 80s and 90s. The same period is also associated with a decline of 
incidence of poverty from 28% in 1978 to 9% in 1998 in China and from 51% in 1978 to 27% in 2000 
in India respectively. 
8 Salai-i-Martin (2002) in his popular paper accept that despite decreasing trends of Global poverty and 
inequality levels, there is some increase in within-country disparities. 
9
Many studies have criticized the results of Dollar and kraay by raising the apparent weaknesses their 
methodology and variable choice suffered from.. i.e see Ravallion (2003), Amann et al (2002), 
Srinivasam and Bhagwati (2002) 
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Murshed (2003) pointed out that the Dollar and Kraay only considered successful 
globalizers, mainly from Asia, in their analysis and excluded the unsuccessful 
globalizers from their sample in order to capture trade and poverty relationships.  
 
Srinivasan and Bhagwati(2001), although admitting that cross country analysis does 
provide some important information, advocates more empirical evidence based on 
country specific case studies to get a more clear and detailed picture regarding 
distributional effects of reforms on the individual countries.  
 
To this effect, much recently, many single country case studies have been undertaken 
on the subject and the evidence suggests that the distribution of the positive effects of 
liberalization is some what skewed towards urban households rather than rural, and 
wealthy households rather than poor.10 It is further noticed in many studies11 that 
liberalization process in many developing countries seems to be biased against low-
skilled labor. The empirical verification in this regard comes mainly from Latin 
American region primarily because most of the economies in the region undertook 
rigorous reform policies in the mid 1980s as part of their structural adjustment plans 
and also witnessed grappling inequality in Post reform periods. Ligovini et al (2001) 
found out that inequality in Mexico rose sharply between 1984 and 1994 and rising 
returns to skill labor accounted for 20 percent of the increase in the inequality in 
household per capita income. Similarly, Hanson and Harrison (1999) found that the 
reduction in tariffs and the elimination in import licenses account for 23 percent 
increase in the relative wages of skilled labor over the period of 1986-1990 thus 
providing evidence for the role liberalization played in rising inequality in Mexico. 
Other country studies on Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Venezuela, also show that 
skilled workers received increased premiums after liberalization when compared to 
their unskilled counterparts (World Bank, 2001a).  
 
Such empirical evidence contradicts the basic trade theory which suggests that trade 
liberalization would result in an increase in demand for low-skilled in a developing 
country, thereby improving the relative earnings of this group compared with the 
more skilled. The evidence further feeds the fears of Ravallion (2003), who coined the 
possibility that openness to trade can lead to the demand for relatively skilled labor, 
which tends to be more inequitably distributed in poor countries than rich ones. He  
also proposed caution regarding the results of David and Dollar (2004) paper 
concerning neutral inequality effects of trade reform on the base of latter’s 
methodology and referred to his own empirical work which found that reform process 
do carry unequal distributional effects. 
 
2. International Trade and Inequality: Why the Debate is Important? 
 
As mentioned earlier there is not much dispute among economists regarding the 
benefits of increased international trade. No doubt increased trade leads to more 
efficient economic outcomes through augmented market access and the followed 
processes of learning by doing. On the one hand international trade is one of the most 
important policy tools for economic growth, whereas on the other hand growth is not 
                                                 
10 see Chen and Ravallion (2003), Cockburn (2001), Friedman(2000), Lofgren (1999).  
11 Behrman et al (2001) noticed that 7 out of 18 Latin American countries that initiated market reforms 
in the mid 1980s inequality have increased in recent times. Where as most Latin American economies 
in their sample showed the inequality was approximately same in 1990s to the levels of 1980s.  
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only one of the most commonly targeted macroeconomic phenomenon but also 
considered to be the barometer of economic well-being.  
 
Growth has been one of the key policy objectives for any economy at the times when 
world was obsessed with Structural adjustment Plans or now, when the world has 
switched its attention to newly improvised Poverty Reduction Strategies.  
 
Apparently, the end objective of any economic policy devised to date is to generate 
welfare and wellbeing of the public and same is true for growth which must also fall 
in the category of welfare generating strategies since the idea has always been that at 
the end of the day growth should be good for poor (see Mamoon, 2004). It makes 
sense because in economics poverty decomposition identifies two channels through 
which poverty is affected. One is the growth channel and the other is inequality. 
Growth is good for poor whereas inequality is not good. Since growth sometimes puts 
an upward pressure on inequality, the more relevant question here is how to align 
growth with poverty alleviation? The simple answer is to sterilize any adverse 
distributional effects of growth to make it a ‘chaste pro poor experience’. However as 
simple as it looks, the answer is much more complex and tricky when put into 
practice. 
 
 Recently World Bank realizes this fact: “For a given rate of growth, the extent of 
poverty reduction depends on how the distribution of income changes with growth 
and on initial inequalities in income, assets and access to opportunities that allow 
poor people to share in growth ………how growth affects poverty depends on how the 
additional income generated by growth is distributed with in a country” (2001b:52). 
 
As mentioned before, international trade is one of the key determinants of growth and 
thus it is considered to be key policy tool for alleviating poverty. However, there is 
increasing evidence that more trade has been associated with more unequal outcomes 
through out the integrating South. Though poverty is decreasing in China and India, 
the rural and urban divide is rising in these so-called success stories of globalization. 
The persistent qualitative inequalities in the South are transformed into income 
inequalities when only more affluent sector or group is benefited from the 
international flow of goods and services. For example, prevalent educations 
inequalities cause rise in wage inequality in the South, where rich or urban are more 
educated or skilled than poor or rural, as it opens up (Mamoon and Murshed, 2005b). 
 
Additionally, inequality is not expected to be good for growth itself (Aghion et al 
1999; Kakwani et al, 2000). World Bank supports the notion that lower inequality can 
increase efficiency and economic growth through a variety of channels. The report 
says: “………policies to improve the distribution of income and assets can have a 
double benefit – by increasing growth and by increasing the share of growth that 
accrues to poor people”( 2001b:56).  
 
Thus, any adverse distributional effects arising from opening up becomes all more 
important because it can also hamper the growth potential of the economy. This 
concern is very eloquently summarized in Slaughter (2000a) as he pointed out that 
many developing countries have recently seen income inequality rise, not fall, 
subsequent to trade and FDI liberalization: “The clear policy message is that 
developing country policy makers should not regard liberalization as a sure-fire 
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poverty reduction program –of course, with the caveat that rising inequality can 
coexist with declines in absolute poverty”. 
 
In the light of above examples, it becomes imperative to discern whether the observed 
patterns of inequality offset any pro poor dynamic benefits of trade liberalization 
since pro-poor growth can only occur when people invest in productive activities and 
the value added of which accrues to poor households more than to non-poor 
households. It is crucial to understand the relationship between international trade and 
inequality in a developing country context in much detail to understand why exposure 
to foreign markets tends to benefit certain segments of the society which are more 
affluent then the rest; or why trade creates disparities in factor incomes by favoring 
certain economic activities (i.e., manufacturing) over others (i.e., agriculture) in a 
developing economy?  
 
3. International Trade and Uneven Development: A Spiral: 
 
There can be several reasons why liberalized trade carries an asymmetrical effect.  
The economic literature has long been contemplating over it by proposing models and 
frameworks which incorporate the possibilities of uneven development within regions 
due to international trade. Important point to note here is that this paper is primarily 
concerned with intra state disparities as an out come of exposure to free trade and not 
inter state disparities.  
 
In this section, we try to explain how uneven development in the South takes place at 
individual level? To this effect, we utilize the model proposed by Fischer (2001), who 
developed a general framework to study the effects of trade liberalization on income 
distribution.  He argued that liberalization leads to capital gains or losses, which in 
turn affect inequality. According to his model, an economic agent’s income has two 
components: wages, which are equal for all agents and wealth, which is unequally 
distributed. Wages are the reward to unskilled labor. Whereas, wealth corresponds to 
the value of assets, which can include holdings of capital, human capital, land, natural 
recourses or any other factors of production. Agents in a particular group receive 
unequal bequests from their parents. A reduction in group inequality leads to the 
reduction in the inequality of bequests to the descendants. Thus according to Fischer, 
changes in inequality are time sensitive. An increase in wages relative to wealth 
reduces inequality by increasing the importance of the component of income that is 
equitably distributed. This model quite amicably captures the developing country 
dynamics because in the developing countries income of unskilled labor is more 
equitably distributed (Ravallion, 2003) and any increase in income of unskilled would 
mean a fall in inequality. Though, Fisher’s framework suggests that the long run 
evolution of inequality depends only on the effect of trade liberalization on interest 
rates, in the short run, inequality very much depends on wage wealth ratio and the 
distribution of inheritance between the groups: 
 
Assume that in an economy, agents earn wages, tw  by supplying labor inelastically to 
the market. Also presume that labor is homogenous so that the wage is same for every 
agent. In other words tw  is the reward for unskilled labor. At the end of their lives, 
each agent provides a bequest to her sole descendent so that the agents are bestowed 
with wealth at birth. Since bequests are unevenly distributed among agents, wealth is 
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a measure of inequality. This is typically inline with a developing country context 
where people start their lives as unequal stake holders because each individual’s 
income is partly determined by his level of education, his exposure and access to 
recourses which are unevenly distributed among the population partly because they 
are the outcome of unequal bequests or investments made by their parents through 
their own equal/ unequal wealth/ bequest. Thus bequest would be the most important 
part of any agent’s wealth and determines his status in the society12.  Galor and 
Tsiddon (1996) also supported the above argument by suggesting that the initial 
distributions of income determine both aggregate income and distribution of human 
capital- and therefore earnings. 
 
Let the total income of any agent be the sum of wages, tw  and bequests/wealth, tb , 
such that ttt ybw =+   
 
Each agent divides her income between consumption and the amount being saved to 
make bequest. There is a continuum of agents in each generation. Agents have 
different propensities for consumption and receive different inheritances from their 
ancestors. This implies that inequality in the income of agents in a society also depend 
on the inequality in initial wealth or inheritance. The ones with more affluent 
inheritance shall likely to be affluent in their lives and vice versa. Trade liberalization 
can affect the level of inequality if it affects the assets of agents. A liberalization 
process, which favors a certain segment of the society, can lead to greater inequality if 
it increases the share of bequests in total wealth. This is because inheritance is 
dispersed unequally among individuals. 
 
Assume that in period t-1, the economy received a shock due to trade liberalization, 
whereas, the physical allocation of assets through inheritance has already been made. 
The value of bequests changes in the liberalized scenario13. Consider the income of an 
agent z with and without shock (the primes denote variables that have changed): 
 
)()( zyzbw ttt =+  
)()( /// zyzbw ttt =+ ,    ].,[ Loz ∈∀                                          (1) 
 
wheras tw is the wages for the unskilled labour 
 
 
Assuming all agents invest their wealth in the different assets in the same proportions, 
a change in the price of any asset will affect all bequests in the same proportion. 
Denoting by tB the aggregate value of the bequests: 
 
∫=
L
tt dzzbB
0
)(                                              (2) 
                                                 
12 Though there might be some cases when individuals do break the class barrier by becoming rich or 
poor than they have started out, such cases would not be very common in a typical developing country 
set up. 
13 The change of bequest can be due to technological spill over affecting the labor productivity thus 
increasing returns to human capital. 
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Denote the ratio of aggregate wealth with the shock to aggregate wealth without the 
shock by  
 
.
/
/
t
t
t
B
B
V =  
 
If there is no shock, .1
/
/
==
t
t
t
B
B
V  Then eq. (1) can be written 
 
 
)()( zyvzbw tttt =+  
)()( //// zyvzbw tttt =+ ,   ].,[ Loz ∈∀                   (3) 
 
This means that the original stocks of assets are scaled by the percentage change in 
aggregate wealth change. The second distribution is Lorenz preferred (see Fisher, 
2001) if Lorenz curve for the income of agent z, with trade shock, lies every where 
above the Lorenz curve for the income of the same with out the shock. This implies: 
 
//
tttt vwvw <  Where as 1=tv  
 
For any variable z, let zdzz ≡
∧
  denote the percentage change in z and let a bar over a 
variable denote its steady state value. It follows from eq. (1.2) that the effects of a 
shock on the distribution of income depends on Sign )( tt vw   
where Sign )( tt vw = Sign )( tt Bw  
 
Thus it implies that any shock that leads to increase (fall) in the ratio of inherited to 
total income raises (lowers) inequality, given the distributions of bequests (see 
Fischer, 2001 for more details).  
 
According to the above frame work, if trade liberalization leads to a greater demand 
in human capital relative to unskilled labor, inequality shall increase further. 
Tinbergen (1975) suggested that inequality was ultimately determined by the 
opposing effects that technology (skilled labor demand) and education (skilled labor 
supply) exerted on the relative wage.  With increased openness, if the demand for 
skilled labor increases and if a developing country fails to match this rise in demand, 
relative wages of skilled labor will swell and increased inequality is a natural 
outcome. Where as, if trade leads to an increase in the wages of unskilled labor a 
more equitable outcome is predicted. Spilimbergo et al (1999) found out that 
inequality is positively correlated with the interaction effect between openness and 
human capital. This means if human capital is unequally distributed, then trade would 
contribute to increase in inequality if it favors skilled or more educated. 
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4. Inequality as an Outcome of Education Policy:  
Generally in most developing countries human capital is unevenly distributed 
(Ravallion, 2003). Thomas, Wang and Fan (2000) and Castello and Domenech (2002) 
have found out that Gini coefficient of distribution of human capital in Sub Saharan 
Africa and South Asia respectively, is the highest in the world. Berthelemy (2004) 
came up with the same conclusion not only for Sub Saharan Africa and South Asia 
but also for Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Further more, according to him, 
the unequal distribution of income in these regions are due to inequitable education 
policies of their respective governments who, on average, focus more attention on 
secondary and tertiary education compared to primary education. Chowdhury (1994) 
also suggests that there is misallocation of resources by the governments of 
developing countries that favor higher education to the neglect of primary education.                                    
In many countries a considerable proportion of public expenditures for education goes 
to middle- and upper-income families, because richer groups are over-represented at 
all levels of education, and particularly at the university level. Public expenditure per 
student increases by each level of education. In African countries, public expenditure 
per student on higher education is 28 (Francophone Africa) and 50 (Anglophone 
Africa) times that on primary education. Further, only a small number of people 
benefits from high public expenditure per student in higher education. For the 
developing countries as a whole, only 7 % of the school-age population enroll in 
higher education (Mingat and Tan 1985). 
One reason for the bias in education policies in these developing countries towards 
higher education may lie in the belief that elementary education has a very limited 
direct role in determining growth rates. According to Barro (1999) the rate of 
economic growth responds more to secondary or higher education levels rather than 
elementary schooling. For example, in developing countries international trade, which 
is one of the key determinants of growth, favours either highly qualified university 
graduates or those who have at least finished their high school. So it is no surprise that 
in order to run the race to be competitive, many developing countries have a tendency 
to invest in higher education at the cost of primary education to achieve greater 
growth. 
Here there is an important role for the government to reverse this situation. The 
government, through investing in education sector and following a balance education 
policy, can improve the human capital on a more equitable basis. Here a balance 
education policy would be to give special attention to rural areas/shanty towns where 
human capital is low as against urban areas/ affluent urban zones (Mamoon, 2005). 
 
Though we have tried to show above how trade can lead to greater inequality among 
individuals, the basic question remains at large. Why would it that international trade 
only benefit skilled or more educated in developing countries? This question leads to 
another equally important question: What are the linkages between trade and labor 
markets, which can explain such behavior?  
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5. Trade Inequality Inter-linkages and the Heterogenic South:  
 
The rationale for expecting an effect of trade on wage inequality is based on the 
standard Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (H-O-S) trade model. As Slaughetr (2000a) 
puts it: “… [free] trade lowers the real wage of the scarce factor and raises that of 
the abundant factor compared to autarky” (p. 131). Assuming that developed 
countries are generally abundant in skilled labor, increasing trade with developing 
countries, which are unskilled labor abundant, should raise the wages of skilled 
workers relative to unskilled in developed countries. Where as, the returns to 
unskilled labor should increase in developing countries with the opening up of trade 
with developed countries. Since evidence does not support H-O-S theorem in case of 
developing countries, what can account for this?  
 
To work through some possibilities, Slaughter (2000b) summarized Stolper-
Samuelson intuition with a line of algebra. Suppose a developing country produces I 
different tradable goods, each of which requires some combination of J primary 
factors and I intermediate inputs. Then for each sector I, one can write the “zero 
profit’ condition as  
 
∑∑
∈∈
+=
Ij
G
iii
Jj
jji
G
i PbwaP            i =1….I                 (4) 
 
where
G
iP is the domestic gross-output price in sector i; jw is the unit cost of the jth 
factor (common across all sectors i); jia  is the employment of factor j per unit of 
output in sector I, (which depends on production technology and, assuming 
technology is not Leontif, factor prices); and iib  is the amount of intermediate input 
hired per unit of good I (which depends on production technology and, assuming 
technology is not Leontif, input prices). Equation (4) has I equations, one for each 
sector, each of which says price just covers cost in equilibrium. 
 
The Stolper Samuelson logic is readily apparent in (4). Domestic product prices 
G
ip depend on both domestic trade barriers and world product prices. Given 
technology, trade liberalization changes domestic product prices, which in turn 
changes domestic factor prices. jw  differ, based on differences in production 
technology and/or trade barriers.  
 
5.1 Protection Effect: 
 
In the simple H-O-S theorem, eq. 4 contains just two equations for two sectors, and 
just two factors of production. In this basic framework, an explanation for rising 
inequality after liberalization can be that developing countries protect the unskilled 
intensive of the two goods, and not the skill intensive prior to liberalization. So after 
liberalization the producers of unskilled intensive good face increased costs amid 
more outside competition in the absence of government subsidies. Thus an increased 
downward pressure is exerted to the wages of the unskilled labor force employed in 
the production of that unskilled good.   
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5.2 Endowment Effect: 
 
However, in the real world there are more than two countries, more than two products 
and sufficiently dissimilar factor endowments across all the countries. A country 
which is unskilled abundant in a global sense can still experience wage inequality 
from opening up if that country is skill abundant in the regional sense.  There may be 
a sufficiently wide range of endowments across countries so that different countries 
make different products – i.e., countries are in different “cones”, with the set of 
sectors I in eq. 4. Thus even if the developing countries produce in similar sectors say 
I among themselves, they will have different comparative advantages because patterns 
of protection might not only reflect they are unskilled abundant globally but also they 
are unskilled abundant regionally. A middle income developing country, which is 
unskilled abundant relative to developed countries but skill abundant relative to low 
income developing countries, can have a comparative disadvantage in unskilled labor 
vis-a vis these low income countries and protection of unskilled labor in these middle 
income developing economies is a natural outcome. Thus when the tariffs are 
abolished the unskilled labor see fall in their wages. Leamer (1998) provides 
supporting evidence by showing that world relative labor endowments are much more 
finely distributed than the simple skill-abundant or unskilled-abundant dichotomy: 
Countries like Mexico may very well be globally unskilled abundant yet locally skill 
abundant, where as countries like China may be unskilled abundant both globally and 
locally. This explains why unskilled labor is protected in Mexico. Wood (1999) 
argues that the entry of countries like China, India, Bangladesh, Pakistan and 
Indonesia in the world markets for goods with a high content of unskilled labor in the 
mid- 1980s has an important impact on income inequality of middle income countries, 
particularly those in Latin America. His argument is that increased supply of unskilled 
labor intensive goods changed the structure of supply of goods in the world market, 
reducing their prices and the return to factors involved in the production of such 
goods. This harmed the countries which had some comparative advantage in their 
production. Vos (2003) noted that Latin American exports lost their competitiveness 
in the global markets after trade liberalization. As a consequence, these countries are 
pressured to change their production techniques in a search for comparative advantage 
in the production of goods which use semi-skilled labor, resulting in an increase in the 
demand for this type of labor and therefore causing wage dispersion. Though this set 
of arguments explains inequality in middle income countries, inequality in low 
income countries remains as a question mark.  
 
5.3 Technology Transfer Effect: 
 
In order to deal with the discrepancy between traditional theory and empirics in low 
income developing countries (i.e., China and India), the trade and technology nexus 
has been put to blame. The greater openness intrinsically brings with it a greater 
inflow of technology that may be skill biased and thus act to increase the demand for 
skilled labor. The line of argument is that South improves its technological base 
through learning from the technology available in the North. Learning takes place 
through technology transfers either through South’s efforts to imitate technologies or 
through importing capital goods available in the North. Where as, in both cases the 
demand of skill labor is increased. Increasing trade between North and South opens 
up new opportunities for developing countries’ producers to learn Northern 
technologies. Liberalized trade, on the one hand, allows easier imports of technology 
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intensive capital goods from north while, on the other hand, it allows Southern firms 
to export to Northern markets and thus, through competition with Northern firms, 
learn and imitate this new technology. Since the introduction of new technologies in 
the South requires skilled labor, demand for this skill group increases and hence, 
skilled wages may rise.  
 
This explanation modifies the benchmark H-O-S frame work in eq. 4 by allowing the 
production technique coefficients jia  to fall (assuming technology improvement) as 
liberalisation also alters prices 
G
ip . Here the tight link from changes in product prices 
to changes in factor prices is loosened because technology changes must also be 
accounted for. Even if liberalisation lowers the domestic price of skill-intensive 
sectors, liberalisation induces sufficient innovation in these sectors such that their 
profitability relative to unskill intensive sectors rises and subsequently wage 
inequality rises, not falls, by the Stolper-Samuelson mechanism of cross-industry 
shifts in factor demands. Gould et al (2000) and Galor and Moav (2000) suggest that 
technology-driven labor demand is central to explaining inequality. Gorg and Strobl 
(2002) also agreed that after liberalisation, purchase of foreign machinery for 
technological progress in Ghana attributed to the relative demand for skilled labor 
though they could not find any direct role of technology in the skill composition via 
export activity. 
 
5.4. International Outsourcing and Technology catch-up Effect: 
 
Outsourcing means that sometimes a skill labor intensive activity (component) is 
outsourced to a lower wage economy whereas that low wage economy should be 
more abundant in both skilled and unskilled labor in absolute terms when compared to 
other lower wage economies. 
 
 It has been widely witnessed that multinational’s international outsourcing is 
increasingly taking place especially in developing countries where semi skilled labor 
is available for cheaper prices. In the case of India and China, inequality might be 
partly due to the fact that these countries are able to export skill and semi-skilled 
intensive goods as a consequence of international outsourcing.  
 
Indian soft ware industry which is concentrated in Bangalore, Mumbai and Pune, is 
highly export oriented, with export growth rates above 50 percent per year during the 
last decade of 20th century. The current rate is still impressive at 23 percent. Whereas 
the goods exports have shown an average yearly increase of 7.5 percent between 1997 
and 2001, which is quite modest when compared with that of the soft ware industry. 
According to Tharakan and Beveren (2003:8): “The reasons for the remarkable 
success of Indian software exports………….include the rapidly growing demand for 
software in the countries of the clients, the cost difference between India and the 
outsourcing countries in employing soft ware professionals…”. Additionally, this is 
also at par with Arndt’s (2000:3) reasoning for the rational behind international 
outsourcing: “The factor intensity of the end product, which has been the focus of 
traditional trade theory, is just the weighted average of the associated component 
factor intensities. Evaluating comparative advantage at the level of components is not 
very different from doing so for products. From the factor–proportions point of view, 
a capital-rich, high wage country, endowed with plenty of skilled workers, will tend to 
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have comparative advantage in the more capital and skill-intensive components of a 
product and comparative disadvantage in components relatively heavy inputs of semi-
skilled and unskilled labor”. It is true that  the Indian software exports owe it to  
international outsourcing than any thing else since the nature of Indian softwares 
remains to be of routine programming and maintenance services, whereas the final 
product and package only constitute 3.16 percent share in the total soft ware exports 
(Nasscom, 2003).   
 
Since the last decade, China has also been identified as a heaven for international 
outsourcing for the companies which are searching for semi skilled and skilled factors 
of production at cheaper prices. Kwan (2002) writes about this phenomenon: “China 
has been taking advantage of its cheap and abundant labour to attract direct 
investment by multinationals, thereby accelerating the pace of industrial development. 
Exports of manufactured goods have increased sharply in recent years to account for 
90 percent of China's overall exports in 2001. Processing trade, which represents 
roughly half the overall trade of China, has come to play a more important role in the 
Chinese economy. With its share of the world's manufactured exports rising, China 
has been widely recognized as the "factory of the world." While Business Week on 
January 2002 commented on the impact of Chinese option on Japanese companies: 
“Some doomsayers predict the decimation of Japan's high-tech manufacturing base -- 
and sayonara to all those nice-paying engineering and production jobs -- as cheaper 
labor, land, and utility costs in China prompt more and more Japanese companies to 
shutter factories at home…………………China could be a "win-win" proposition for 
Japanese companies. They would save billions in production costs, keep at home 
high-end research-and-development, design, and other critical jobs, plus plug into a 
vast consumer market for their goods…………True, big players like NEC and 
Matsushita already know this and are shifting more and more resources to China .”  
 
 
 Zhu and Trefler (2003) observed that developing and newly industrialized countries 
that have experienced the sharpest increases in wage inequalities are those whose 
export shares have shifted towards more skill intensive goods. They name it as 
“technology catch-up”. This observation, in addition to giving a very convincing 
reasoning regarding the cause for inequality as a consequence of trade liberalisation, 
also challenges the core of H-O-S theorem. Along with importing skilled-labor 
intensive goods, the developing countries also indulge in exporting skill intensive 
intermediate goods. Zhu and Trefler elaborated this behavior by developing a model 
in which Southern catch-up causes production of least intensive Northern goods to 
migrate to South (where they become most skill-intensive Southern goods) - thus 
raising wage inequality both in the South and the North. The empirical evidence 
presented in the study suggested that Southern catch-up shifts export shares towards 
South’s most skill intensive goods. Second, the resulting shift in export shares 
increases the level of wage inequality. Thirdly, Southern catch-up does not directly 
raise wage inequality. Rather, Southern catch up raises wage inequality only 
indirectly by raising the export shares of the South’s most skill-intensive goods.  
 
5.5.   Technology Catch-up Effect under Factor Endowment Dynamics: 
 
One of the implications of trade on inequality, can also be hauled out by furthering the 
argument of Leamer (1998) of ‘global and local differences in skill intensities’ and 
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combining it with the theory of ‘technology catch up’. Addendum to Leamer’s model 
can be easily specified by taking into account intra country disparities in skill 
intensities, in addition to global verses local one’s. Please note that intra country 
disparities capture regional inequalities within a country whereas global and local 
disparities capture regional inequalities across countries. 
 
Here China and India are the countries which are globally and locally less skill 
intensive when compared to the medium to high income countries. However within 
China and India, there are patterns of uneven development because of unequal factor 
intensities. There are certain regions which are skilled labor intensive while others are 
low skilled intensive. As we discussed above, the IT sector in India is concentrated in 
only three locations where skilled labor is available in abundance. These geographic 
locations are also considered to be relatively high income regions. They are the same 
regions which also benefit mostly from post liberalization technological change or 
catch-up, since they are endowed with relatively higher amounts of skill intensive 
factors of production. Thus in developing countries, post liberalization ‘technology 
catch up’, which happens in an uneven manner, because of an uneven domestic factor 
endowments across various regions, has implications for income inequality.  
 
5.6  Familiar Factor Endowments Effect: 
 
In an attempt to understand inequality in less developed countries, it is also edifying 
to ask what distributional effects trade carries when these countries are trading with 
each other? Actually, Bourguignon and Morrison (1999) coined the idea to analyze 
the effects of international trade on income distribution on the basis of similar factor 
endowments and levels of development. They noticed that Northern economies trade 
with each other more than they do with the South.  They found out that in North-
North trade, increased trade volumes are associated with lower skilled wages and 
higher unskilled wages.  
 
However, any attempt has yet to be made to analyze the distributional effects of 
South-South trade. The need for such a study comes from the fact that developing 
countries lie in different stages of technological catch-up which makes it functional to 
analyze the dynamics of South-South trade in relation to inequality, while accounting 
for intra-country disparities.  As the developing country moves forward in technology, 
it naturally indulge in more advanced production patterns and more and more of its 
trade, especially exports are concentrated in products involving high skilled labor. As 
one developing country is climbing the technology ladder, the other developing 
country at a lower stage starts taking over the production activities, which are least 
skill-intensive in the former as part of its own technology catch-up phenomenon. For 
example, China has a higher pace of technology catch-up then many of less developed 
countries in East Asia, Latin America or Sub Saharan Africa. China has built a sound 
technology base primarily because of its low factor costs. Chinese exports are getting 
more and more skill intensive as a result. As China advances in technology and 
produces goods and services involving higher skill intensive labor, there is increasing 
chance for other developing countries, at lower stage of technology ladder, to exploit 
this situation by taking-up the production of goods and services which require 
relatively less skill intensities in factor inputs if produced in China.  
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Ianchovichina and Walmsley (2003) hinted on the effects of China’s technology 
catch-up on the developing countries of Asia: As China becomes a more efficient 
supplier of services or a more efficient producer of high-end manufactures, its 
comparative advantage will shift into higher end products. This is good news for 
Vietnam. Indonesia and other developing countries ………………Vietnam and 
Indonesia will benefit the most if China’s economy becomes more efficient in the 
production of high-end manufactures. In contrast, the most favorable outcome for the 
NIEs is for China to continue to specialize in labor intensive products (p.20).”  From 
1991 to 2001, trade between China and Vietnam has grown nearly 100 times, and 
China is a major investor in Vietnam, which indicates that later country is an 
important place of outsourcing by Chinese companies. Though Chinese investments 
are good for the growth of Vietnamese economy, the distributional impact of trade 
with China might not be as favorable. Jensen and Tarp (2003) found out that in 
Vietnam, the short to medium term impact on poverty levels among the poor are 
inversely related to changes in investment expenditure, where as reduction in trade 
taxes have adverse distributional effects. Though the study captures distributional 
effects of trade or investment in general for the Vietnamese economy, It should not be 
improbable to implicate these results for a case when the effects of investment or 
trade with a major trading partner (i.e., China) is accounted for. Assuming that the 
same results hold for Chinese investments in Vietnam and also employing 
‘technology catch-up’ and ‘international-outsourcing’ arguments, one can imply that 
Vietnamese economy is taking over the products in which its trading partners do not 
have comparative advantage any more because these products employ relatively less 
skill intensive inputs, which however are considered as sufficiently skill intensive in 
Vietnam. Though, this is beneficial for the economy and its growth potential, such a 
phenomenon also sets out to favor the skill labor in (urban) Vietnam which in turn 
causes greater inequality.  
 
The purpose of this discussion is to show that trade between countries with similar 
factor endowments also has implications for inequality, especially in a developing 
country context. Nevertheless, a more pertinent and comprehensive empirical analysis 
is desired to demonstrate whether South-South trade can expound trade-inequality 
liaison in developing countries.  
 
5.7  Price Elasticity Effect:  
 
Rodrik(1997) and Slaughter (2001) identified yet another route through which trade 
might cause increase in inequality. Rodrik (1997) partly blamed the rise in inequality 
in the U.S economy on the easing labor demand elasticities. He also emphasized that 
in imperfectly competitive context, the elasticity of demand for labor is higher with 
greater openness. Slaughter (2001) pointed out that the link between factor demand 
elasticities and product market elasticities is directly established through Hicks’ well 
known ‘fundamental law of factor demand’ which implies that demand for anything is 
likely to be more elastic, the more elastic is the demand for any further thing which it 
contributes to produce. Since product market elasticities are likely to rise with trade 
liberalisation, this implies that, with greater trade openness, we should see an increase 
in labor demand elasticities as well.   
 
Rodrik (1997) argued that openness could put labor markets under greater pressure 
because rising elasticities shift the wage or employment incidence of non wage labor 
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costs towards labor and away from employers. Secondly, higher elasticities trigger 
more volatile responses of wages and employment to any exogenous shocks (arising 
from shocks to productivity or to output demand) to labor demand. Also, increase in 
elasticities leads to the erosion of the bargaining power of labor vis-à-vis capital in 
sharing abnormal profits.  
 
Using industry-level data disaggregated by states, Hasan, Mitra and Ramaswamy 
(2003) find a positive impact of trade liberalisation on labor demand elasticities in the 
Indian manufacturing sector. These elasticities turn out to be negatively related to 
protection levels that vary across industries and over time. Furthermore, they find that 
these elasticities are not only higher for Indian states with more flexible regulations; 
they are also affected largely by trade reforms. Finally, they find that after reforms, 
volatility in productivity and outputs gets translated into larger wage and employment 
volatility: a consequence of larger labor demand elasticities.  However, Krishna, Mitra 
and Chinoy(2001) suggest that for Turkey the putative linkage between greater trade 
openness and labor demand elasticities is somewhat weak. They attributed the 
weakness to the variety of frictions that affect labor demand decisions of the firm. 
 
5.8  Wage Premium Effect: 
 
Yet another link in trade-inequality argument is developed by employing the concept 
of efficiency wages/wage premia.  Wage premiums represent the portion of worker 
wages that cannot be explained through worker or firm characteristics, but are 
attributed to worker industry affiliation. Wage premiums are also associated with 
higher productivity.  Moreover, worker industry affiliation plays a crucial role in 
explaining the impact of trade reforms on worker wages especially in trade models 
with imperfect competition and rent sharing. Studies that don’t consider industry 
affiliation miss an important channel through which trade affects wage distribution. In 
developing countries as well as developed countries, there are restrictions on labor 
movements, thus again calling for the inclusion of industry affiliation wage- 
premiums in trade-inequality debate.  
 
According to Pavcnik et al (2003), the effect of trade policy on industry wage 
premiums has important implications for the wage inequality: “ Since different 
industries employ different portions of educated and skilled workers, changes in 
industry wage premiums translate to changes in the relative incomes of skilled and 
unskilled workers. If tariff reductions are proportionately larger in sectors employing 
less-skilled workers, and if these sectors experience a decline in their relative incomes 
as a result of trade liberalisation, these less-skilled workers will experience a decline 
in their relative wages. This effect is distinct from the potential  effect of trade 
liberalisation on the economy-wide skill premium. More over, industry wage 
premiums might vary across workers with different levels of skill or education. For 
example, the more educated workers may be more (or less) mobile in the labor 
market, have accumulated more sector specific human capital, or have bargaining 
power over industry rents. If wage premiums differ across workers with different 
levels of education, and trade liberalisation increases the industry specific skill 
premiums, this could provide an additional channel through which the reforms affect 
wage inequality (p.3).” 
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Pavnick et al (2003) is one of the very few studies which have focused on the relation 
ship between trade policy and industry wage premiums. Their results suggest that in 
Brazil trade liberalization has not lead to lower industry wages in the short run. They 
conclude that though there is no evidence that the tariff declines worsened inequality 
through changes in the structure of wage premiums, the industry wage premiums do 
vary widely across Brazilian manufacturing sector. In addition, they found that the 
former are smallest in sectors with high shares of unskilled workers suggesting that 
unskilled workers earn relatively low wages not only because of the growing 
economy wide skill premium, but also because they are employed disproportionately 
more in industries with low wage premiums. Nevertheless, Goldberg and Pavcnik 
(2004) did found a positive link between trade protection and the average wage 
premia for Colombia. Similarly,  Dutta (2003),  also conclude that for Indian 
economy, the impact of trade liberalisation on the inter-industry wage premia is 
substantial and more protected industries tend to have higher relative wages; whereas, 
the industries that undergo larger tariff reductions have lower wages relative to other 
industries.  
 
6. Conclusions:  
 
The paper contributes towards our understanding of processes of globalisation and 
growth and how they are related with pro poor outcomes. Our discussion suggests that 
though more trade might be good for the poor in the short term, there is welfare 
distorting effects which might hamper the positive returns in the long run as 
international trade does carry unequal effects. Whether inequality matter or not in a 
pro poor pro growth debate is not an issue for discussion anymore. Inequality 
certainly matters.  
 
The recent reports of World Bank and United Nations, namely ‘Equity and 
Development, 2006’ and ‘The Inequality Predicament, 2005’ respectively, have tried 
to press that reducing inequality is central to tackling poverty and bringing about 
sustainable economic growth. 
 
The 2006 World Bank report concludes that inequality of opportunity, both within 
and among nations, sustains extreme deprivation, results in wasted human potential 
and often weakens prospects for overall prosperity and economic growth. Whereas 
2005 United Nations report suggests that inequalities between and within countries 
have accompanied globalization. These inequalities have had negative consequences 
in many areas, including employment, job security and wages.  However, both reports 
accept that there is still a debate concerning the specific role of liberalization policies 
in these trends. 
 
In sum, the paper has been an outcome of the recent concern in the echelons of policy 
making whether the potential benefits of trade liberalization (i.e., increased efficiency 
and welfare) outweigh the potential costs of trade reforms (i.e., increased inequality, 
potential ‘race to the bottom’ in wages). To this effect, this paper tries to positively 
contribute to the debate by illustrating many conduits through which international 
trade sets out to favor skilled or affluent in a developing country context and cause 
inequality. Most of the empirical approaches/methodologies reviewed in our paper are 
in their primary stages and a lot of empirical evidence is expected to come forth in 
this respect.  
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